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Blockchain technology has been receiving much public attention recently, promising to 
disintermediate transactions through a decentralized governance and a distributed data-
infrastructure. However, the majority of the previous studies have focused on the technical 
aspects, and overlooked blockchain investigation from a managerial perspective. In this paper, 
based on platform-ecosystem, transaction cost economics, and open-source literature, we 
contrast and compare blockchain-based platforms and centralized platforms; in other words, 
decentralized versus centralized governance of the platform. We base our conceptual analysis 
on three dimensions—transaction cost, cost of technology, and community involvement—, 
exploring the conditions under which blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous than 
centralized platforms. We, first, compare gains from lower opportunism and uncertainty 
thanks to protocols and smart contracts in blockchain technology versus costs of higher 
coordination and complexity of (re)writing those contracts. Second, we compare gains from 
immutability and transparency in blockchain-based platforms versus the technological cost of 
verification and distributed ledger infrastructure. Finally, we compare intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations of community around centralized and blockchain-based platforms to participate 
and different mechanism involved, i.e. pricing mechanism in the former and crypto-incentives 
in the latter. 
 Keywords: blockchain technology; platform ecosystems; decentralized governance; 







Despite the hype around blockchain technology, the main attempts to understand such 
technology has been mainly restricted to the technical aspects of the blockchain protocols and 
foundations, or the finance of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin (Risius and Spohrer, 2017). 
Nonetheless, implications of the blockchain technology reach far beyond the financial system 
(e.g., De Filippi, 2017; Li et al., 2017). Consensus protocols, smart contracts, cryptography, 
and distributed ledgers allow for secure, immutable, transparent, and often cheaper 
transactions, which can be applied to a variety of contexts (Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2016; 
Halaburda, 2018). As a consequence, various digital platforms and start-ups have started 
adopting blockchain technology for micropayments, storage system, intellectual property, 
financial and physical assets, supply chain and logistics, social networks, media and open 
science amongst others applications (Li et al., 2017; Davidson, De Filippi, and Potts, 2018).  
A broader understanding of blockchain and its peculiar attributes, from organisation 
and management perspective, is less explored (Constantinides, Henfridsson, and Parker, 2018; 
Risius and Spohrer, 2017). Filling this void, we build on platform governance, transaction cost 
economics, and open source communities literatures to investigate the costs and benefits of 
adopting blockchain technology as a decentralized platform infrastructure, exploring the 
boundary conditions and the trade-offs involved. Blockchain technology enables the property 
rights transfer and exchanges built upon decentralized governance and distributed data 
infrastructure (Catalini and Gans, 2017), in opposition to centralized platforms that present 
centralized governance and data infrastructure (e.g. Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Jacobides, 
Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018; Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush, 2010). Thereby, we contrast and 
compare the centralized versus decentralized governance mechanisms, as in (conventional) 
centralized platforms and blockchain-based platforms, respectively to understand under which 
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conditions are blockchain-based platforms more advantageous compared to centralized 
platforms. 
Decentralization of governance and data-infrastructure in blockchain-based platforms 
(Halaburda, 2018) can to a certain extent mitigate centralized platforms inherent problems, 
such as a higher bargaining power for the platform sponsor, lock-in effects, censorship, data 
leakage, expropriation, and privacy risks (Catalini and Gans, 2017). Thereby, we discuss 
conceptually, how the promising properties of blockchain may, in turn, cause other challenges 
such as coordination and complexity problems, and high cost of verifying and storing 
transactions in absence of a third party. We categorize the benefits and costs arising at different 
levels pertaining to transaction costs, technology costs, and community involvement.  Based 
on these three parameters, we propose a framework to circumscribe the boundary conditions 
for adopting blockchain-based platforms vis-à-vis centralized platforms. We, first, contrast the 
lower transaction cost associated to reduced opportunism and uncertainty with the higher 
coordination and complexity costs of changing rules for the blockchain platform when 
contracts need to be amended (i.e., in situations when uncertainty is higher). Second, we show 
that while blockchain technology provide benefits resulting from immutability and 
transparency (i.e. temper-resistance, and fraud prevention, cost of auditability) it can be too 
costly at both verification and storage levels. Lastly, we also show how blockchain-based 
platforms leverage on intrinsic and extrinsic (crypto-incentives and reputation effects) benefits 
to attract participants, in opposition to centralised platforms that mainly leverage extrinsic 
benefits.   
Our paper contributes to the emerging, yet nascent, body of literature about the potential 
and limitation of blockchain technology (see Risius and Spohrer (2017) for a recent review of 
the previous studies). In particular, we provide an early answer to the question “how does 
blockchain technology address misaligned incentive structures and trust currently faced by 
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digital platforms?” (Constantinides et al., 2018; p. 11). This paper explores the costs and 
benefits of blockchain-based platforms, drawing the boundary conditions of its applicability. 
The adoption of blockchain technology is not only a question of technology cost (see Catalini 
and Gans, 2017), which is rapidly decreasing, but is also a question of governance costs. This 
paper aims at exploring the tipping point of the trade-off between the cost and benefits of 
technology and governance modes to answer the question: “under which conditions shall 
transactions be conducted in blockchain-based platforms in contrast to centralized platforms?”  
Before we explore when blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous than 
centralized platforms, we briefly explore the differences between centralized and blockchain-
based platforms across governance and data-infrastructure dimensions.   
 
2. Theoretical foundations 
2.1. Centralized Platform governance 
Platform ecosystems are increasingly dominating the business landscape. The so-called 
FAANG companies (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google), the “motors of S&P 
500”1, are only few infamous examples of platform ecosystem, which is a prevalent model, 
especially in digital industries, from smartphones, videogame consoles, media-based and 
video-on-demand portals, to Internet of Things (IoT) platforms and wearable devices. In these 
ecosystems, usually, a central firm sponsors the core components and interface upon which 
third-party firms (i.e. complementors) develop and offer their complementary products (i.e. 
complements) to the end-users (e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Jacobides et al., 2018; Tiwana 
et al. 2010). The platform sponsor (e.g., Apple), at the core of the ecosystem (e.g., iOS App 
Store), facilitates the interaction between the complementors (e.g., app developers) and users 
                                               
1 See here: https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/04/the-tech-giants-are-still-in-rude-health 
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(e.g., mobile users), for instance by reducing the search cost; it also provides complementors 
with a common set of technology, boundary resources (e.g., APIs and SDKs), and marketing 
capabilities (e.g. featured apps and top charts) (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). 
Complementors, benefiting from participation and co-specialization in the ecosystems, build 
their product offering, hence creating value for the ecosystem and platform users (Ozalp 
Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). There is also an indirect network effect between the users and 
complementors; users are better off by a high rate of complementors’ participation (thus, 
complements variety), and vice versa (e.g., Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).   
Accordingly, a sustained rate of co-specialised innovation and product offerings by 
complementors intertwined with growth in platform adoption by users are pivotal for the 
platform success and survival. The platform sponsor, therefore, should apply appropriate 
governance mechanisms to motivate third-party firms to join the ecosystem and make 
investment, orchestrate the innovation process, regulate the access and interaction among users 
and complementors (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009), enhance the network effect and attract 
users— in a nutshell, to manage the value co-creation and value capture processes within the 
platform ecosystem (Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, Wu, 2012).  
The primary mechanism, which has been studied in a vast body of literature (e.g., 
Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Weyl, 2010), is the pricing structure. The decision about fixed 
membership fee and/or per-transaction fee and, cross-subsidisation pricing strategy are among 
the essential pricing structure decisions to manage the platform ecosystem (Rochet and Tirole, 
2006).  
An array of non-pricing instruments also exists for platform governance, such as 
exclusivity contracts with certain complementors (e.g., Cennamo and Santalo, 2013), platform 
sponsor decision to develop in-house complements, i.e. entry to the complementors market 
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(e.g., Gawer and Henderson, 2007), the quality assurance and certification for the 
complementors and their products, or designing the entry rules. The last one, perhaps the most-
studied topic in non-pricing governance mechanism, pertains to the platform openness (e.g., 
Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2009; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2017) 
and the extent to which the platform applies exclusion/restriction policies for complementors 
to affiliate with the ecosystem. This openness can occur (vertically) at the complementors’ 
level, at users level, or (horizontally) at the hardware and technology interface level. It can also 
be even deeper at sponsorship and governance level (Eisenmann et al., 2009). For instance, 
Apple is less open than Google concerning the complementors’ entry to the app store. Also, 
while Android is an open platform to various hardware developers (such as Samsung, HTC, 
etc.), iOS has remained closed to only Apple’s iPhone. On the other hand, open software such 
as Linux are almost open platforms even to at the governance and design rule level. This is 
directly related to the concept of proprietary versus shared platform. The former is when the 
core functionality of the platform is under the control of a single sponsor (as in the case of 
Apple), while in the latter the platform sponsorship is shared collectively (e.g., Linux open 
software or Visa owned by an association of several banks). Later, we discuss more both the 
regulatory role of the platform and the right degree of openness in the “boundary conditions” 
section. 
2.2.Blockchain-based platform 
The blockchain technology encompasses the protocol that defines the main rules that will 
govern the platform functioning and the data infrastructure, and smart-contracts, which are self-
executing contracts that enables automated transactions (Buterin, 2015; Davidson, De Filippi, 
and Potts, 2016a). In this section, we will compare Blockchain-based platforms’ governance 
and data infrastructure with centralized platforms.  
7 
 
Blockchain-based platforms, either proprietary or non-proprietary, tend to present a 
decentralized decision-making in which the community around the platform not only suggests 
changes to the code and rules of the platform (by committing to codes usually in GitHub) but 
also decides which of these changes will be implemented through forums, discussion groups, 
or voting systems. For example, Satoshi Nakamoto launched the Bitcoin protocols (which also 
encompasses the blockchain technology itself) to the community, and nowadays the 
community around Bitcoin maintain the protocol, and decide about the directions of the 
technology through soft and hard forks of the code (Böhme et al., 2015). Some proprietary 
centralized platforms have also initiated open source movements, as is the case of Android; 
however, while community members can make suggestions to amend the code, they are not 
able to decide which suggestions are actually implemented. The decisions about the future 
direction of the platform, which coincide with its technology components and interface, are 
centralized in the proprietary in centralized platforms in a censored open source fashion.  
The entry rules determine who is allowed to participate in the platform, being related 
with the degree of the platform openness in opposition to censoring. Centralized platforms 
often directly regulate the access and membership, requiring users and complementors’ 
authentication (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). Despite recent variations, blockchain original 
conception relies on freely open membership,  also known as permissionless blockchain. In 
this sense, blockchain-based platforms are both horizontally open (at infrastructure technology 
and interface level) and vertically open (at complementors and users level) (Eisenmann et al., 
2009).  
Blockchain-based platforms also differ from centralized platforms regarding 
verification processes, which obey to a pre-agreed consensus mechanism. While in centralized 
platforms, the platform owner is the entity validating transactions and deciding which 
transactions are valid or not; in blockchain-based platforms, an independent pool of validators 
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verify the transactions (known as miners in the Bitcoin blockchain). These validators need to 
follow a consensus mechanism based on peer-to-peer cryptographic verification process to be 
able to validate blocks of transactions, creating a secure, immutable, transparent, time-stamped 
public ledger (Davidson et al., 2018). Validators follow a  verification mechanism that allows 
to reach consensus about which transactions are true and eligible to be added to a block of 
transactions, which itself linked to the previous block, forming a continuous chain back to the 
original first block of all (Davidson et al., 2018). Blockchain, thus, enables a trustless 
verification system that does not require a third party to verify transactions. Instead, it applies 
a  verification system to ensure consensus among users about the true state of the ledger, fuelled 
by crypto-incentive to involve validators in a disintermediated verification process (Davidson 
et al., 2018). 
 Decentralization of decision-making and verification processes require high levels of 
participation of the community around these platforms either by producing, consuming, voting, 
coding or verifying transactions. Crypto-incentives fuels such participation, encompassing 
crypto-tokens and cryptocurrencies. Crypto-incentives are blockchain fungible and tradable 
assets able to be exchanged inside the platform to buy complements or converted into other 
crypto-currencies or fiat currencies (such as USD or EUR) outside the focal platform. 
Blockchain community members can acquire crypto-tokens or cryptocurrencies through Initial 
Coin Offers (ICO), crypto exchanges, or instead, earn them by performing some activities 
inside the platform. The crypto-incentives fuels participation and verification of transactions, 
securing the maintenance of the platform (Davidson et al., 2018). The crypto-incentives in 
blockchain-based platforms, equivalent to pricing structures and non-pricing instruments in 
centralized platforms, function as a coordinating mechanism which is essential to attract users, 
complementors, developers, and validators; hence, boosting the network effects. 
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Apart being a new paradigm for governance (i.e. at protocol or application stack), 
blockchain technology at the infrastructure level (mainly ownership and accessibility) is also 
fundamentally different when compared to centralized platforms. While in centralized 
platforms, the platform sponsor owns and control the access to data, in blockchain-based 
platforms, the ledger of transactions, which stores the history of all transactions, is stored in 
many locations simultaneously in a distributed fashion (Nakamoto, 2008). As the distributed 
ledger is replicated across the network nodes, if there is any attempt of a node to falsify a 
transaction (double spend), the moment that this node ledger is checked against all the other 
nodes’ copies, the falsification is spotted and automatically corrected. This redundancy of 
information, along with the verification mechanism described earlier, ensures security, 
immutability, and transparency of transactions (Atzori, 2015; Risius and Spohrer, 2017).    
Blockchain-based platforms are based on decentralized governance and data infrastructure, 
which allows marketplace agents to transact directly with each other without the need for a 
trusted intermediary (Catalini and Gans, 2017; Nakamoto, 2008; Davidson et al., 2018). 
Blockchain-based platform, thus, represent an extreme case of “openness” with decentralized 
governance and a distributed data infrastructure able to disintermediate transaction. Such 
disintermediation can reduce transaction costs (Halaburda, 2018) and failures inherent to 
centralized platforms, such as lack of transparency, corruption, coercion, censorship, and 
excessive market power (Atzori, 2015; Catalini and Gans, 2017). Table 1 summarizes the 







Table 1. Main characteristics of blockchain-based platform versus centralized platform 
Platform dimensions Centralized platforms Blockchain-based platforms 
Governance 
Decision-making Centralized (platform owner take decisions) 
Decentralized (community 
democratically take decisions 
about the future of the platform) 
Entry rules Always Permissioned Permissionless 
Verification of 
transactions Centralized Decentralized 
Incentives Pricing mechanisms Crypto-incentives 
Data 
infrastructure 
Ownership Proprietary Distributed 
Accessibility Private access Public access 
Examples Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google Steemit, Bitcoin, Ethereum 
 
3. The boundary conditions: blockchain-based platforms vis-à-vis centralized platforms 
Scholars defend that blockchain has the potential to improve productive efficiency of some 
economic operations, moving them closer to a peer-to-peer ideal (Davidson et al., 2018). The 
answer to the question why some transactions occur in blockchain-based platforms rather than 
in centralized platforms is because blockchain-based platforms can reduce transaction and 
technology costs, and foster community involvement, in comparison to centralized platforms. 
Yet, these advantages can be offset by some shortcomings such as higher coordination, 
complexity,  verifications and storage costs, and lower intrinsic benefits in the medium-term. 
Building on these costs and benefits, we propose three main boundary conditions under which 
adopting blockchain-based platforms is more beneficial than centralized platform. We discuss 
each of these conditions as follows.  
3.1. Transaction costs and smart contracts  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses on “transactions and the costs that attend 
completing transactions by one institutional mode rather than another” (Williamson, 1975: 1–
2). In particular, it focuses on the relative efficiency of organizing through markets, hybrid 
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forms, or hierarchies, with the main unit of analysis being a transaction (Williamson, 1985). 
This theory predicts that organizations choose the most efficient (TCE economizing) way of 
organizing depending on the nature of transactions. Guided by two assumptions of uncertainty 
and opportunism, three factors regarding the nature of transactions determine the choice of 
organization in TCE: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Asset specificity relates to 
the nature of investments in the transaction–if some assets that are required for the particular 
transaction cannot be used elsewhere without loss of (significant) productive value, then the 
asset specificity and the bilateral dependency between parties is high, which makes contracting 
through markets hazardous. Uncertainty relates to the ex-ante haggling and ex-post bargaining, 
and affects transactions only when there is some nontrivial level of asset specificity (David and 
Han, 2004). In those conditions with some asset specificity, as uncertainty rises, market 
becomes a less economic way of organizing compared to firms. Frequency is the last 
dimension, and it relates to the need of monitoring the transactions – as frequency increases, 
more resources required for monitoring the transactions in a market, and therefore hierarchical 
firm represents a better alternative when transaction frequency is high. 
Uncertainty and opportunism relate these factors in different ways. Asset specificity is 
generally the stronger element in determining organization choices, and it is closely connected 
to opportunism. Although not everyone will be opportunistic, there is always the risk of 
opportunism – or as Williamson (1975) puts it forward “self-interest seeking with guile”. On 
the other hand, uncertainty is more related to the bounded rationality – the fact that humans 
have “limited information, attention, and processing ability” (Simon, 1945), which gives rise 
to contractual incompleteness. 
Blockchain, as a technology is quite relevant to approach from a TCE perspective as 
the technology itself has the purpose to disintermediate transactions, reducing transaction costs 
associated to opportunism and uncertainty. Blockchain-based technology encompass the 
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protocol and self-executable smart contracts, which trigger transactions automatically under 
certain conditions (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017). The fact that the protocol and the smart contracts 
are defined ex-ante and that smart-contracts are automatically triggered reduces opportunism 
in transactions (Davidson et al., 2018), especially relating to ex-post hold-up costs across 
parties in a transaction. Smart contracts also reduces transactions’ uncertainty regarding 
information problems (Davidson et al., 2018) as the contract automation guarantees that under 
certain conditions the output will be the same and irreversible (see Williamson (1973), for 
sources of transactions uncertainty). In this sense, the degree of uncertainty about the execution 
conditions and output of a certain transaction decreases, reducing the transaction costs. 
Additionally, the cost of writing the protocol and smart-contracts is spread by the amount of 
transactions that on the limit can present an infinite frequency due its automated nature 
(Davidson et al., 2016a). Finally, as the blockchain technology suppresses the need for an 
intermediary— the traditional platform owner — contributes also to mitigating the hold-up risk 
caused by intermediary agent itself that could intervene in the transaction in order to realize 
individual gains through lack of candor or honesty (Davidson et al., 2016a; Williamson, 1973).2   
The blockchain, however, generally require complete contracts as they get executed 
under certain conditions without intermediaries (therefore require full extent of contingencies), 
as opposed to companies that exist as a nexus of incomplete contracts (Wright and De Filippi, 
2015; Davidson et al., 2016a; Hart and Moore, 1990). Nevertheless, some blockchain-based 
platforms are able to offer services usually performed by traditional firms. One example is 
Bitcoin that up to a certain extent replaces banks, and another is Steemit, which is a public 
blockchain-based platform for content generation, equivalent to Facebook. Blockchain-based 
platforms are able to substitute centralized platforms for the transactions that can be rendered 
                                               
2 However, it is important to note that ex-ante and ex-post bargaining and renegotiation costs may not be 
eliminated with blockchain (Davidson et al., 2016a) 
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as complete contracts, lowering the transactions cost for such activities through irreversible, 
transparent, and automated codes of contracts (Davidson et al., 2018). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to admit that we do not need banks to perform certain types of transactions anymore, 
because such transactions are easy to parameterize and perform through Blockchain protocols; 
however, if you look for advice on specific financial assets and a customised treatment, which 
is a difficult transaction to parameterize, one might recur to traditional banks.  
In sum, blockchain-based platforms, which rely on smart contracts and publicly 
available distributed ledgers, can replace centralized platforms when contracts are (quasi-) 
complete by reducing transaction costs related to opportunism and uncertainty. 
There is, however, an additional set of costs that blockchain incur relating to 
coordination (Arrunada and Garicano, 2018) and complexity. Blockchain transactions are 
irreversible, being highly inflexible and restrictive in their nature. When consumers have a 
contract with a bank that takes care of their money, they incur the risk of misuse of their money 
and data, but they also expect a customised attendance based on their needs and some degree 
of irreversibility in case there is a mistake in a transaction or if the money get stolen. In 
blockchain, as the protocol and smart contracts are restricted to a certain amount of operational 
conditions that tend to be more standard than customised, it is unlikely that the contract predicts 
all contingencies, as unintentional mistake. Ultimately, as the full code, including protocol and 
smart contracts, is open source, new conditions could be inserted into machine-readable 
contracts that can indeed be altered in the future. Davidson et al. (2016b, 2018) defend that the 
complexity cost of improving or changing contracts would scale linearly, and transaction costs 
lowered. However, this view ignores that coordination costs increase in a growing open 
community as everyone can suggest changes in the code and have voting rights. Such level of 
coordination include key issues in blockchain-based platforms that lead communities to split-
up through “hard forks” lead by minorities and inertia caused by the expectation of split up or 
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not getting the required number of votes for the change (Arrunada and Garicano, 2018). This 
is the point when communities engage on extensive and intractable discussions. Community 
split-ups and inertia lead to inefficient outcomes, which we highlight as an increased 
coordination cost (Arrunada and Garicano, 2018).  
Contractual changes in blockchain-based platforms increase complexity and 
coordination costs not only at the community level but also at a technological level. Davidson 
et al.’s (2018) argument that open databases allows for reduced costs of writing contracts is 
simply not feasible. Increasing complexity, by adding contingencies to the protocol or smart-
contract, may cause big issues at the code level, as code bugs often lead to security breaches. 
For example, such problems led Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) to be hacked, 
what eventually required a “hard fork” on the system, overriding the irreversibility principal 
and causing internal turmoil (Arrunada and Garicano, 2018). Such increasing code complexity 
can force transactions to have lower number of conditions. This then suggests that the addition 
of conditions to protocol and smart contracts exponentially increases costs due to increase of 
security and uncertainty costs, which we call complexity costs. 
In sum, blockchain-based platforms can handle (quasi-)complete contracts with lower 
opportunism and uncertainty costs, therefore providing a transactions cost advantage. Yet, 
blockchain-based platforms get costlier when coordination and complexity is an issue (e.g., 
platforms with a massive number of members), mainly when high incompleteness requires too 
many conditions to enact transactions.  
P1: When gains from reduced opportunity and uncertainty costs outweighs the losses 
from increased cost of coordination and complexity, the blockchain-based platforms 




3.2. Cost of Technology and verification mechanism 
Not only can blockchain reduce the transaction cost, but it may also lessen the initial building 
and ongoing activity costs directly related to the technology. Efficiency also comes from 
deleting layers of activity that are no longer needed because trusted third party is not required 
anymore (Davidson et al., 2018). A central intermediary platform for securing the transaction, 
generating trust, and maintaining the data can open up the risk of data breach, privacy risks, 
and censorship risk (Catalini and Gans, 2017). Blockchain, by alleviating these risks and 
vulnerabilities, can be productivity enhancing. Yet, like other new technologies, blockchain, 
while beneficial in some dimensions and materializing previously non-existent opportunities, 
may suffer from drawbacks and inefficiencies on some other dimensions.  
We classify the cost (dis)advantages of blockchain technology in two categories; first, 
at the protocol and application level. For example, blockchain enhances efficiency of 
international money transfer via omitting the cost of intermediation, process, and verification 
(Catalini and Gans, 2017). Each transaction (be it financial as in Bitcoin or other types of 
transaction such as property transfers) to be added to the chain of existing blocks needs to go 
through a verification process and consensus mechanism (such as the proof-of-work). The 
proof-of-work involves solving a randomized mathematical puzzle which is complicated to 
solve but easy to verify by other nodes of the peer-to-peer network. The validators of the 
blockchain (also called operators or miners) compete with each other to solve this puzzle which 
generates a number, called a hash, to encrypt and seal the blocks of the recent transactions. 
Upon verification of the hash value by other nodes, the new block will be attached to the 
blockchain. Each block contains the hash value of its own as well as that of the previous block; 
hence, the blocks are linked securely to each other.  
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Manipulating a single piece of information in the blockchain not only requires to 
generate a new hash for the given block; it also needs to alter all the consequent blocks´ hashes, 
so that no one can detect the break in the chain, a task which is nearly impossible in practice 
(e.g., Böhme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore, 2015). This protocol makes the information 
stored on the blockchain tamper-proof and immutable without any need to a central 
intermediary or a trustable third-party. This disintermediation, therefore, cuts the fee that would 
have been charged by the intermediary for conducting the transactions and operating costs of 
such platforms, and mitigates the risk of double-spending, data manipulation, and cost of 
auditing, amongst others, all of which has been called as cost of verification by Catalini and 
Gans (2017). They argue that blockchain technology makes a costless verification possible.  
However, the real picture is not as promised above. The consensus and verification 
mechanism, which guaranties the immutability and transparency of the stored transactions, 
hence generating trust via protocol and codes without a need to a trustable party, inherits some 
restrictions. For instance, conducting transaction via Bitcoin network is still slower and less 
efficient than Visa or PayPal (Davidson et al., 2018). In fact, the potential throughput in the 
Bitcoin is up to seven transactions per second, compared to two thousand transactions per 
second in Visa (Yli-Huum, Ko, Choi, Park, and Smolander, 2016). Moreover, the proof-of-
work is indeed an energy consuming and capital-intensive task. It can cost “approximately 
$178 million per year at average US residential electricity prices” (Böhme et al., 2015: 218). 
In fact, to keep the immutability of the blockchain the effort (time, energy, computing power, 
etc.) required for proof-of-work should remain difficult and costly enough, despite any feasible 
increase of computing power of the validators. Thus, the technological cost of verification and 
immutability of the blockchain are intertwined.   
The second category of technology cost of blockchain-based platforms is related to the 
infrastructure (i.e. the bottom stack upon which protocols, tokens, and applications are built). 
17 
 
In the case of centralized-platforms, a single entity sponsors and owns the infrastructure stack 
or core of the platform while keeping the components to the complementors to develop. 
Conversely, in the blockchain-based platforms, as a distributed leger, the records of all 
transactions are stored on all the nodes of the network (i.e. users of the platform). In other 
words, the core of the platform is not owned by a single sponsor but shared and distributed 
across the users. As a copy of every piece of information is available on each node, the data 
hack and failure become even more difficult (on top of difficulties due to verification and 
consensus mechanism) and easily detectable. The double storage of data also provides the 
nodes of the network with transparency. On one hand, the more nodes have trace of the data; 
the data becomes more tamper-proof. On the other hand, scaling up the network means 
participation of more users with an access to the transaction data and ability to (dis)validate 
transactions. The blockchain protocol as a “trust machine”3  does not rely on the trustworthiness 
of the users; however, the possibility of misconduct and fraudulent attempt cannot be excluded. 
Scaling up, for example being a entirely public platform without any entry rules, can increase 
the likelihood of misconduct, which creates diminishing returns to trustworthiness or 
deterioration of “peripheral trust” (Evans et al., 2016). These two opposite forces foreground 
a scalability trade-off for the platform—it is more difficult to fool many; yet, the probability of 
cheating increases with being open to many. 
Additionally, distributed ledger brings cost savings by replacing the central servers and 
infrastructures with a peer-to-peer network. Yet, duplicating all records and updates of the data 
can makes the reconciliation and integrity of the ledgers slower and more costly, which 
deteriorate exponentially as the size of the network increase, which puts additional restriction 
to the scalability of blockchain-based platforms. 
                                               
3 See here: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31/the-trust-machine 
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Finally, the cost advantage of blockchain technology is accentuated if the assets in 
transfer are purely digital, an ideal example of which is the Bitcoin. However, when the 
transactions represent some offline or physical entities (such as the usage of blockchain in 
supply chain or real estate sector) both the verification and storage become more costly, i.e. 
less technological cost advantage at both protocol/application and infrastructure stacks. There 
should be a reliable link between the digital record and the corresponding event in the physical 
world, which necessities the existence of some trustable parties (which are called oracles), 
without which the blocks may be a secure and immutable record of merely some fake 
assets/incidents (Catalini and Gans, 2017). Keeping a strong link between the two and solving 
this gateway problem (Halaburda, 2018) increases the cost of verification (i.e. multiple parties 
and agreed rules to verify the data entry and authenticity of the link) and/or the cost of 
infrastructure and storage (i.e. hardware devices such as GPS, RFID, or internet of things to 
substantiate and store the online record of the offline world).  
Proposition 2. When the gains from immutability and transparency of transaction 
outweighs the losses from increased technology cost of verification and storage, the 
blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous than centralized platforms. 
3.3. Community involvement and crypto-incentives 
We have not yet discussed the role of the collective of individuals that build and sustain 
blockchain-based platforms. Similarly to other online communities, specifically open source 
communities, in blockchain-based platforms, the community encompasses individuals who 
communicate, interact, and develop relationships, in order to collectively attain a common goal 
through an IT-supported virtual space  (Lee, Vogel, and Limayem, 2002; Preece, 2000; Tardini 
and Cantoni, 2005). The main distinction between an open source community and a blockchain 
community is that the latter comprehends a broader range of roles for the individuals. Precisely, 
communities around blockchain-based platforms do not only include the end-users that 
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consume complements and the producers of those complements (complementors), but also the 
developers, which contribute through code and commits to the maintenance of the platform 
interface and components, and validators, which verify transactions and register them on the 
distributed ledger. Additionally, all individuals across these different groups can vote or decide 
for or against implementing changes in the platform in a decentralized and “democratic” 
fashion. This rationale is aligned with Davidson and colleagues (2016a) suggestion that 
blockchain forms constitutional communities around the platform.  
The idea of collectives of people coordinating to achieve common goals beyond the 
boundaries of the firm is not new; indeed, there is a long history of users and communities as 
important drivers of innovative activity and new organizational forms (O’Mahony and 
Lakhani, 2011; Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000). The example of Apache, Linux, and Wikipedia, 
amongst others, show that collectives that communicate and engage in repeated interactions 
can efficiently coordinate to create socio-economic value (Benkler, 2017). Those individuals 
share not only similar needs, concerns, passion and interests, acting collectively in order to 
meet these needs (see Felin, Lakhani, and Tushman, 2017; Preece, 2000; Tardini and Cantoni, 
2005; Wenger, 2011), but they also share values and beliefs (Preece, 2000; Tardini and 
Cantoni, 2005), which guide the way activities are conducted in those organizations. Indeed, 
many crowd and community-based organizations are considered social movement entities 
(Felin et al., 2017) that present strong political, social and even revolutionary ideological 
aspirations where goals, values and beliefs are intermingled (Stallman, 2002). For example, on 
Steemit, a blockchain-based public content platform, community members have the common 
need to consume or produce content in a certain topic, sharing the belief that community 
members must appropriate the value of their contributions in producing, promoting, and 
curating content for others. These values and beliefs oppose the ones of similar platforms as 
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Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter (Steemit Whitepaper, 2018), in which the platform owner 
appropriates the value created by users and producers.  
Research on open source communities reveals that participants’ motivation intrinsically 
relates to the nature of the community activities. For example, activities that satisfy a need, 
fulfill values and beliefs, and have a self-rewarding nature, which encompasses intellectual 
stimulation, new skills development, and making a positive difference (Lerner and Tirole, 
2002; Villarroel and Tucci, 2010). Such intrinsic motivation feed volunteers participation, 
cooperation, and coordination around a project and a common goal, sharing their knowledge 
without, in most of the cases, subjacent direct pecuniary incentives (Amabile, 1983). Having 
said that, in addition to intrinsic motivation, open source communities also enact reputation 
mechanisms, through which members get recognition, respect, and status among peers, what 
can translate in future rents in terms of improved job opportunities (Dahlander and Magnusson, 
2005; Franke and Shah, 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lee and Cole, 2003; von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003). 
The debates about the underlying nature of community members’ motivations is an 
ongoing conversation. While some argue that intrinsic motivation continues to play a 
significant role in fostering participation, others argue that all of these activates simply 
represent a type of selfish market logic, where members still seek for rents; yet deferred into 
the future (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Indeed, empirical studies reveal that a few number of 
communities are successful at retaining their members and fostering members’ repeated 
contributions (Ma and Agarwal, 2007). Most of the communities are unable to attract a 
considerable number of members or because self-selected members do not have the right set of 
skills or are not engaged enough to generate an interesting amount of content and interactions 
(Ma and Agarwal, 2007). One possible reason is that members, through time, start to manifest 
concerns with intellectual property and value appropriation, what may lead to diminishing 
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incentives to participate on open source projects (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2015). At the same 
time, it is indeed difficult to measure and value members’ contributions to meet their extrinsic 
motivation, as through pecuniary incentives. Measuring members’ contributions is difficult 
because the process of finding and negotiating a price for each contribution and protect and 
license intellectual property could induce prohibitive transaction costs (Franke and Shah, 
2003).  
Contrary to open source communities, centralized proprietary platforms rely on pricing 
structures based on membership fees, cross-subsidisation pricing strategy, rent appropriation 
and revenue sharing to foster members’ participation by leveraging on extrinsic benefits 
(Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). However, researchers have already showed that strong extrinsic 
rewards for engaging in an activity might decrease individuals’ intrinsic motivation, hence, 
negatively affecting the nature of interpersonal interactions and creativity (Amabile, 1985; 
Franke and Shah, 2003). While open source communities leverage mainly on intrinsic rewards, 
and centralized proprietary platforms rely mostly on extrinsic benefits, blockchain-based 
platforms harness incentive mechanisms anchored on both intrinsic and extrinsic benefits, 
which, however, vary over time (Davidson et al., 2018).  
In blockchain-based platforms, it is possible to distribute value amongst community 
members trough protocols, smart-contracts, and crypto-incentives (crypto-tokens and 
cryptocurrencies) with much lower transaction costs. The crypto-incentives are embedded in 
blockchain-based platforms functioning; key piece of their protocols and smart-contracts. Such 
protocols and smart-contracts link community members’ actions to respective rewards. For 
example, when end-users consume the complements, they can spend tokens, but if they provide 
reviews, or promote or curate content, they can receive tokens for their contributions. Similarly, 
producers receive tokens in exchange for their complements, and validators of verifying 
transactions. As members’ number of tokens is registered on the ledger, which is distributed 
22 
 
and publicly available; the number of tokens earned function as a reputation indicator—
members with more tokens earned are the members that contribute the most to the community. 
Additionally, tokens have a convertible value in crypto-currencies and fiat money. Therefore, 
all community members (users, complementors, validators, developers, and investors) that 
possess tokens, either by buying or earning them through contributions, have strong incentive 
to contribute and collaborate towards network growth and interface and components quality 
improvement as such factors can positively impact the value of their tokens.  
For example, on Steemit, a public blockchain-based platform for content development, 
complementors are the people that create content, for which they receive a reward in STEEM 
Power (one of the platform’s native crypto-tokens) based on the number of votes that they 
collect from audience. End-users, i.e. readers of the content, vote for or against the content, 
promoting and curating such content. Steemit operates on the basis of one-token for one-vote, 
which means that STEEM Power owners (end-users, complementors, and validators) that 
contribute the most to the platform, as measured by their account balance, have the most 
influence over how contributions are scored. Steemit validators, called witnesses, are the ones 
that create and sign blocks of transactions. Outside of Steemit platform, the STEEM token 
(which can be obtained through STEEM Power) can be bought or sold on exchanges, as well 
as transferred to other users as a form of payment (Steemit Whitepaper, 2018). While in the 
beginning, members tend to receive a higher number of tokens in order to foster community 
participation, these tokens tend to have low value in the beginning, and the opposite happens 
on the long-term.  
Blockchain community members’ benefits result from a balance between intrinsic 
benefits that they extract from using, complementing, developing the platform, and the 
potential extrinsic benefits from the future value of the tokens and reputation effects.  However, 
as the community evolve in terms of the number of members, contributions, and interactions, 
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member’s benefits from these different sources may vary throughout time. Specifically, in the 
beginning, the members who join the community are the ones that present higher intrinsic 
motivation. Therefore, the high intrinsic benefits compensates the yet low extrinsic benefits (as 
the tokens have low value and there are low reputation effects) in the short-term. Members’ 
intrinsic motivation increases as the level of interactions and contributions start to increase. 
The intrinsic benefits reach an optimal point when the number of participants is big enough to 
generate interesting and stimulating levels of contributions and interactions (Baldwin and von 
Hippel, 2011), but it is not too big that the sense of community in terms of shared needs, values 
and beliefs dilutes. If the number of community members increases too much, the sense of 
community slowly vanishes, coordination and complexity increase, discussions become 
extensive and intractable, and at this point, intrinsic motivation starts to decrease. However, 
extrinsic benefits (reputation and crypto-incentives) show a slightly different trend. While in 
the beginning, extrinsic benefits have little value as the community is small, hence the gain 
from reputation is not substantial, and the value of the token is minimal.  As the community 
grows in the number of participants, contributions, and interactions, it tends to increase in value 
of the token and in significance of reputation. In this sense, whereas in the short-term, the 
intrinsic benefits compensate the low extrinsic benefits; in the medium-term, assuming that the 
community increases, the increasing extrinsic benefits may compensate the decrease in 
intrinsic benefits.  
P3a.  When gains from intrinsic benefits compensates the low extrinsic benefits in the 
short term, blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous than centralized 
platforms. 
P3b. When the gain in extrinsic benefits outweighs losses from intrinsic benefits in the 




4. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper explores the distinction between centralized and blockchain-based platforms, where 
the latter represent an extreme case of “open” platform. We compare and contrast these 
platforms’ governance typologies across three dimensions, namely transactions, technology, 
and community involvement. The contribution of this paper lies on the identification of the 
main benefits and costs of each platform governance type, drawing on the conditions under 
which blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous than centralized platforms.  
In previous sections, we highlighted that from a transactional perspective blockchain-
based platforms are preferable over centralized platforms when reductions in the transaction 
costs–mostly driven by reduction in opportunism, and partially, uncertainty–are higher than 
increases in coordination and complexity costs. We can unpack each of these gains and costs 
related to blockchain to see further patterns of improvement, and consequent increases in the 
use of decentralized platforms compared to centralized ones. A first set of potential changes 
relate to the increased potential of adaptation given the current upsides and downsides of the 
blockchain. We are currently observing an adaptation process with many competing start-ups 
and “product” or “business model” innovations are competing to take advantage of the 
blockchain technology–we see a similar evolution in AI technologies, for example. The 
adoption of blockchain and its impact will be more evident as advances in both blockchain 
protocols and accompanying complementary innovations improve the technology 
infrastructure (Brynjolfsson, 2017). Increased adoption with such innovation 
complementarities between applications (or use cases) and the blockchain technology itself 
(Bresnahan, 2010), will make the technology even better in its benefits, for example, allowing 
decreased complexity and coordination costs as more conditions are added to protocol and 
smart contracts in order to improve contracts completeness.   
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Coordination costs can also relate heavily on the evolution of governance modes and 
experiences in blockchain-based platforms. Experimentation through application cases will 
help to delineate the most efficient and effective contracts according to the nature of the 
application. For example, DAO was an extreme important experiment on decentralized 
autonomous governance modes, which has failed due to a security breach in the code but 
opened an avenue for novel governance solutions that might also have contributed to the 
emergence of blockchain technology.  Such evolution is similar to centralized platform models 
that result from years of institutional support and well-known organizing routines (Arruñada 
and Garicano, 2018).  Blockchain technology evolution throughout forthcoming years might 
change dramatically the set of transactional gains and costs proposed in this paper. We hint that 
in the further years, the gains from adopting blockchain will increase; implying that such 
decentralized “market” platforms will be more suitable for an increasing number of 
applications, in contrast to centralized platforms, which might be advantageous for a narrower 
number of cases (Davidson et al., 2018). 
Blockchain verification process and consensus mechanism can also prevent the network 
from failure and fraud without any need to a central regulator or even a trustable third party.  
This “trustless” and tamper-proof governance system, however, is costly to implement and can 
be inefficient vis-à-vis centralized platforms.  The high and ever-increasing cost of verification 
via proof-of-work is a prime example, as described earlier. As a blockchain-based platform 
grows and number of validators (miners of Bitcoin for instance), the higher computing power 
and more massive energy is needed to solve the mathematical puzzle and create a new block. 
Hence, there is no clear prospect for a reduction of this cost of technology in the future. On the 
contrary, based on the computing power that has been added to the network, the difficulty of 
the puzzle should be elevated to keep the block creation costly and energy-intensive, thus, 
ensure the tamper-resistance of the network.  
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There are alternative verification and consensus mechanisms that try to find a remedy 
for the problems of proof-of-work protocol. Most importantly in the so-called proof-of-stake 
verification process, which has been introduced by Ethereum platform (Davidson et al., 2016a). 
In such consensus mechanism, the computing power is replaced by the stake of validators—
i.e. the amount of native crypto-currency that users possess. This process reduces verification 
costs, regarding computer power and energy consumption; however, it may boost costs and 
drawbacks in other dimensions. For instance, entitling the wealthiest validators to validate 
transactions and create new blocks endangers the decentralized nature of blockchain-based 
platforms. For instance, if most of the stake is in hands of few people; technically the 
(dis)verification of the transactions would be skewed towards few nodes, around which the 
governance of the platform will be centralized. Therefore, proof-of-stake while reducing the 
verification cost of technology, it may open of the risk of opportunism; hence, higher 
transaction cost. Further research shall investigate the main distinguishing dimensions amongst 
different consensus protocols, relative benefits and costs, and under which conditions a certain 
consensus mechanisms is preferable over the others. 
We discuss that blockchain-based platforms are more advantageous compared to 
centralized platforms when the intrinsic benefits outweighs low extrinsic benefits in the short-
term. We also defend that through time and as the community grows, intrinsic benefits would 
decrease, as extrinsic ones would increase. As long as intrinsic and extrinsic benefits balance 
each other, blockchain-based platforms would be the most beneficial form. This proposition 
might holds even when there are “hard forks” in the community. As the community increases, 
higher is the likelihood that dissonant voices start to emerge, leading to the emergence of 
minorities that differ in their needs, values and beliefs, what eventually will lead to a 
community split-up. For example, Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin Unlimited, and Bitcoin Cash are Bitcoin 
protocol forks that aim at increasing block sizes, which allows more transactions per second, 
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overcoming one of the scalability problem of Bitcoin (Cryptocurrency facts, 2018; Gervais, 
Ritzdorf, Karame, and Capkun, 2015). Communities “hard forks” mean that the community 
will split in two (or more). Members that keep adhering to the original community format, they 
will increase their intrinsic motivations, as the dissonant voices left and the community got 
more homogeneous. However, as a part of the members left the community, the community 
size decreases, what will negatively impact the extrinsic benefits (token valuation and 
reputation effects). In this regard, the community would survive a “hard-fork” as long as the 
increase in intrinsic benefits outweighs the drop in extrinsic benefits.  
The blockchain-based platforms tokenization mechanisms are useful not only to foster 
extrinsic benefits to enhance cooperation and collaboration but also to dynamically distribute 
authority amongst members in a meritocracy system (Davidson et al., 2018). The biggest 
challenge of such system is to design a protocol that score individual reputations and incentives 
that most of community members consider fair and attractive. Simultaneously, such algorithms 
also need to be resistant to intentional manipulation. If there is wide abuse of the incentive 
systems, the community members “lose faith” in the platform, decreasing participation. The 
incentive system needs to reach a balance between creating mechanisms to avoid abuse and 
opportunistic behaviour, but it also needs to be simple and clear, so members have clear 
expectation about their rewards. Reaching this equilibrium between simplicity and robustness 
might be difficult to achieve. Indeed, nowadays, most tokenization models comprehends 
multiple tokens with different natures, and extremely complex incentive systems, hard to 
understand and predict expected rewards. Such complexity denotes the lack of knowledge in 
selecting the most efficient incentives systems accordingly with the nature of the blockchain 
activity and goals. Quantitative and experimental research is much needed on this field in order 
to understand community members’ adherence to different incentive systems.  
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It is worthwhile to mention that while we discuss the costs and benefits of blockchain 
based platforms in three separate dimensions (i.e. transaction cost, cost of technology, and 
community involvement), in principle, all three dimensions are intertwined. Improving in one 
area and bending the boundary condition in favour of blockchain-based platforms may be 
disadvantageous in another dimension. For instance, as mentioned earlier, applying proof-of-
stake may overcome the massive cost of verification problem but make the platform more 
exposed to the opportunism of few wealthy validators. We hope that our paper provides a 
simplified, but clear, theoretical framework to assess the “optimal” points of adoption of a 
decentralized platform compared to a centralized one. Future research can provide a more 
holistic picture by linking theses three areas together and potentially exploring different 
dimensions not investigated in this piece.  
Nowadays, we already witness several variations amongst blockchain-based platforms, 
where some are proprietary but keep decentralized governance and distributed data 
infrastructures, or others that are non-proprietary but the code and data infrastructure are closed 
and permissioned. We are passing through an experimentation period when “a thousand 
flowers are blooming” and we might be far from standardization. On the top of this variance 
amongst governance and data infrastructure dimensions, we can also find differences on the 
nature of the activities of blockchain-based platforms. For example, while some are purely 
transactional, as is the case of cryptos like Bitcoin, whose goal is to exchange and store value; 
others use crypto-tokens associated to services or products, called as utility-tokens, such as 
Steemit platform. This paper intentionally under explore such differences, focusing on the 
conditions under which blockchain-based platforms with both decentralized governance and 
distributed data infrastructure are likely to be more advantageous than centralized platforms. 
However, we encourage that further research focus not only on the main dimensions that 
distinguish different blockchain-based platforms, but also on under which conditions our 
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propositions about transaction costs, technology costs, and community involvement have 
higher or lower traction.  
This paper has the goal to inspire discussion and further research on blockchain-based 
platforms relative benefits and costs, offering a more contingent perspective on this new 
emerging technology. The three main sources of costs and benefits explored in the paper show 
key points for further empirical research that surely needs to test our propositions. Not only our 
propositions are individually showing some expected effects, but also taken together, they 
originate relevant interactive effects for further consideration. This paper is of theoretical and 
empirical relevance, as many blockchain based consortiums and start-ups are trying to uncover 
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